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ABSTRACT 
Knowledge withholding may co-occur with knowledge sharing, but current 
research has a negative connotation and focuses on quantitatively investigated 
antecedents. However, the social context seems to play a crucial role in this phenomenon. 
We therefore investigated knowledge withholding and leader behavior. In doing so, we 
applied a qualitative methodology and analyzed five memoirs of U.S. general and flag 
officers. The 1,853 memoir pages revealed 247 knowledge-withholding instances and 
eight different actors. We developed a framework of interdependence theory and social 
identity theory to order and explain the data. We found that the general and flag officers, 
as well as the other actors, withheld knowledge. Also, knowledge is withheld to (a) gain 
an advantage over another actor (negative interdependence), (b) yield a benefit for oneself 
and a trusted actor or to gain an edge over an untrusted actor (positive interdependence), 
(c) adhere to predetermined processes (neutral interdependence), and (d) create an 
advantage for the group with which a person socially identifies (social identity). Most 
importantly, the general and flag officers use knowledge withholding as a tool to achieve 
their goals. These findings indicate that this phenomenon in leader behavior may have 
been overlooked and should undergo further research. 
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“What do I know? Who needs to know? Have I told them?” U.S. General Mattis 
repeatedly asked these questions to himself and the people around him to ensure that 
everybody is informed. In his book Callsign Chaos, he describes how, on multiple 
occasions, this mantra enabled initiative among his troops. On the one hand, it seems that 
U.S. General Mattis heavily focused on knowledge sharing to increase performance. 
Research supports this practical example and shows that leader behavior that increases 
knowledge sharing also increases performance (Srivastava, Bartol & Locke, 2006). Leader 
behavior can also improve performance by facilitating knowledge sharing with people 
within and outside an organization (Obeidat & Zyod, 2015). Furthermore, leaders can 
fulfill various roles, and research shows that most of these roles have a strong and positive 
influence on knowledge sharing (Yang, 2007). 
On the other hand, the second question, “Who needs to know?” also suggests that 
not everybody needs to know everything. This indicates that U.S. General Mattis also 
consciously withheld knowledge. In his book, he even describes that “the details you don’t 
give in your orders are as important as the one you do” (p.44). Some researchers have also 
noticed this nuance. They started to consider knowledge withholding as a phenomenon that 
may co-exist with knowledge sharing instead of considering it as the dark side of 
knowledge sharing or the other side of the continuum (Kang, 2016; Lin & Huang, 2010; 
Pan & Zhang, 2018). Extant research on knowledge withholding reveals a slightly negative 
connotation (Holten, Hancock, Persson, Hansen & Hogh, 2016; Huo, Cai, Luo, Men, & 
Jia, 2016) and focuses on why and when this phenomenon occurs (Anand, Centobelli & 
Cerchione, 2020; Xiao & Cooke, 2019). Moreover, thus far, only a few researchers have 
studied leader behavior and knowledge withholding (Offergelt et al., 2018; Peng et al., 
2019).  
Although Anand et al. (2020) describe events in which knowledge withholding 
occurs, they do not specifically put a person with a leadership role at the center stage. 
Looking at the example of U.S. General Mattis, we sense that current research may have 
overlooked knowledge withholding in leader behavior. We, therefore, focus on a leader as 
2 
an actor in knowledge-withholding events. We recognize the importance of the context in 
which people withhold knowledge. As such, we take a broad perspective and focus on the 
research questions: “In what types of events do leaders withhold knowledge?,” “Who are 
the other actors in knowledge-withholding events?,” and “How do leaders use knowledge 
withholding in their work?” Due to our research question’s explorative nature, we will take 
a qualitative approach and investigate five recent U.S. general and flag officers’ memoirs.  
Our contributions are threefold. First, we offer an investigation from the perspective 
of leader behavior in regards to knowledge withholding. We, thereby, also distill the 
various actors in these events. Second, we present an integrative framework that organizes 
knowledge-withholding events and actors. This framework illuminates the theoretical 
mechanisms of leader behavior and knowledge withholding. Third, we provide an analysis 
that illustrates how leaders use the integrative framework of knowledge withholding.  
We, therefore, start with a theoretical framework based on the two theories of 
interdependency and social identity. We then describe our qualitative methodology and, 
subsequently, continue with the results. At the end of this paper, we discuss the findings 
and conclude that all actors withhold their knowledge and, more specifically, leaders apply 
the integrative framework as a tool to achieve their goals.  
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Until now, we discussed knowledge withholding as one broad concept, but other 
researchers also identified the related constructs of knowledge hiding (Connelly, Zweig, 
Webster & Trougakos, 2012) and knowledge hoarding (Evans, Hendron & Oldroyd, 2015). 
Knowledge withholding is defined as “the likelihood that an individual will give less than 
full effort to contributing knowledge” (Lin & Huang, 2010, p. 188). This broad definition 
covers all situations in which knowledge is unrequested or requested by another person. 
This definition also covers situations in which knowledge is intentionally or 
unintentionally withheld. While knowledge hiding and hoarding are categorized within the 
knowledge-withholding definition, researchers agree that the two constructs are distinct 
from each other (Connelly et al., 2012; Kang, 2016). More specifically, knowledge hiding 
and hoarding are intentional behavior but differ in applying (un)requested knowledge. 
On the one hand, knowledge hiding involves requested knowledge. It is defined as 
“an intentional attempt by an individual to withhold or conceal knowledge that has been 
requested by another person” (Connelly et al., 2012). On the other hand, knowledge 
hoarding refers to the intentional withholding of unrequested knowledge. It is defined as 
“an individual’s deliberate and strategic concealment of knowledge and information or the 
fact that they may possess relevant knowledge or information” (Evans et al., 2015, p. 495). 
Note that Evans et al. (2015) use knowledge hiding and hoarding as synonyms while Anand 
et al. (2020) considers knowledge withholding, hiding, and hoarding as similar concepts. 
We regard these three as distinct concepts.  
Although Anand et al. (2020) conducted a systematic literature review and 
described various events in which knowledge hiding occurs, these events lack a coherent 
theoretical explanation. While we aim to develop such an integrative framework, we build 
on their work of identifying reasons. Moreover, current research reveals 93 reasons of 
knowledge withholding. Furthermore, not all these reasons are distinct constructs. For 
example, 16 reasons regard to personality traits such as neuroticism, openness to 
experiences, and conscientiousness (Chawla & Gupta, 2020; Pan & Zhang, 2018). Another 
seven reasons focus on leader behavior (Peng, Wang & Chen, 2019; Zhao, Liu, Li, & Yu, 
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2019) while many others illuminate reasons such as competition (Butt & Ahmad, 2019), 
(dis)trust (Connelly, Zweig, Webster & Trougakos, 2012; Lin & Huang, 2010), and 
(in)justice (Abubakar, Behravesh, Rezapouraghdam & Yildiz, 2019; Pan & Zhang, 2018).  
While empirical evidence supports these 95 reasons and thoroughly explains why 
people withhold, hide, and hoard their knowledge, they do not investigate this behavior in 
a situational context. Take, for instance, war as the ultimate example of competition. Butt 
and Ahmad (2019) showed that competition positively relates to knowledge hiding, so the 
greater the competition, the greater the knowledge hiding. This relation is imaginable for 
the actors who are at war with each other. They both have an obvious goal to defeat their 
opponent. Therefore, the actors have a high level of competition and a high level of 
knowledge hiding due to the positive relation.  
However, during war, knowledge about an upcoming attack is hidden from 
opponents and the people within a unit. While competition explains the knowledge hiding 
towards the opponent, this does not explain the knowledge withholding inside the unit. 
Looking at current evidence, collaboration has a negative relationship with knowledge 
hiding, so the more collaboration, the lesser knowledge hiding (Chawla & Gupta, 2019). 
When we assume that the unit is about to start an attack has a high level of collaboration, 
this finding suggests that knowledge hiding should be low. So, this antecedent does not 
explain the knowledge withholding within that unit. A similar rationale applies to the 
antecedent trust, which negatively relates to knowledge hiding (Lin & Huang, 2010). So, 
trust does also not explain the knowledge withholding with the unit.  
Taken together, knowledge withholding within a military unit during wartime 
seems to be one example that cannot be explained by current research. The present 
quantitative research does not seem to value the “messiness” of human interaction. We 
suggest that these actors and their goals have some interdependence level (Johnson, 2003; 
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In other words, the actors’ goals are related to each other, and 
interdependence theory explains this relationship. For example, if the planned attack 
succeeds, then that unit achieves its goal. At the same time, the opponent loses and does 
not meet their goal. This illustrates that the goals of the unit and the opponent have a 
negative relationship. If one wins, the other loses. This relationship is called negative 
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interdependence. The example also shows that if the unit achieves its goal, everybody in 
that unit successfully realizes their aim. This illustrates that the unit’s goals as a whole and 
the individuals in the unit have a positive relationship. This is called positive 
interdependence. 
However, interdependence theory is not sufficient to explain all these situations. 
We suggest that an actor can also withhold knowledge based on social identification with 
a larger group. Social identity theory describes that people may experience overlap between 
their individual and group identity. The groups may be countries, organizations, teams, or 
professions (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tajfel, 1978). This identification may even be so 
strong that people act against their self-interest (Turner, 1978). Returning to the example, 
the unit commander who planned an attack may identify strongly with that unit. Based on 
this social identification, he may decide that knowledge withholding towards his unit 
member benefits them all.  
Therefore, we take a step back and explore events of leader behavior and 
knowledge withholding. We start by reducing the “messiness” of human interaction and 
identify the events and actors. Questions that we have are the following, “Do leaders 
withhold, hide, or hoard knowledge?,” “Do other actors show this behavior to leaders?,” 
and “Do leaders have various interdependencies and social identities?” Next, we organize 
these events and actors in an integrative framework of interdependence theory and social 
identity theory. Moreover, this framework explains the leader’s behavior in knowledge-
withholding events. Lastly, we reintroduce the “messiness” again and use the data to 
describe how leaders apply this framework of knowledge withholding, hiding, and 
hoarding as a tool in their daily work. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. SELECTION OF DATA SOURCES 
This research project aims to identify the events and actors of knowledge 
withholding. On the one hand, military organizations tend to be closed institutions 
(Kleinreesink & Soeters, 2016), but more and more of its personnel have chosen to write 
their memoirs (Harari, 2007). Authors of memoirs draw on their memory to write a 
narrative that looks back on their experiences. Such a narrative tends to be reflective and 
describe social situations. They also cover defining moments over a substantial period 
when the main characters participated in combat. In doing so, memoirs may directly serve 
as data sources for research (Harari, 2007; Marche, 2015; Kleinreesink & Soeters, 2016; 
Rozman, 2019). Moreover, they are specifically useful for studying command and 
command networks (Harari, 2007).  
On the other hand, memoirs are not similar to historical accounts and are censored 
by definition (Harari, 2007; Kleinreesink & Soeters, 2016). Most memoirs (61%) 
acknowledge their narrative as subjective even though many (57%) make some truth claims 
(Kleinreesink & Soeters, 2016). They are also less accurate than wartime diaries, letters, 
and administrative documents but can complement those documents (Harari, 2007). 
Moreover, only the study of other sources can reveal the missing elements in memoirs 
(Rozman, 2019). Taken together, military memoirs may provide valuable insights into 
leader behavior in social situations such as knowledge withholding. 
Besides these advantages and disadvantages, memoirs may be written by authors 
other than the main character. These authors are credited for their work or they acted as 
ghostwriters. In the Oxford English Dictionary, the latter is defined as “a hack writer who 
does work for which another person takes the credit.” In all these instances, a memoir must 
present the main character’s true experiences and reflections (Barrington, 2002). Therefore, 
we will discuss some memoirs reviews to identify potential bias and shortfalls in the data 
sources. Taken together, we used military memoirs as qualitative data sources to 
investigate leader behavior and knowledge withholding.  
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Furthermore, we applied the multiple case-study methodology of Yin (2010) to 
U.S. general and flag officers’ memoirs. The selection of memoirs is based on six criteria 
(see Table 1). We identified the U.S. general and flag officers who had been commanders 
of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, or the operations in 
Afghanistan. The latter operations were named the International Security Assistance Force 
and Resolute Support. This resulted in a list of 35 U.S. general and flag officers. The wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq ran at the same time so many of these officers had experience in 
both geographical areas. For example, General Petraeus served as the commander in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. While some of these general and flag officers wrote a book, we 
specifically investigated which of them wrote a memoir. Based on the six criteria, we 
identified five sources of data. These data sources are the books of General Mattis with 
Callsign Chaos, General McRaven with Sea Stories, General McChrystal with My Share 
of the Task, General Frank with American Soldier, and General Petraeus with his book The 
Insurgents. Note that Callsign Chaos and The Insurgents are written by credited authors 
other than the main character and we found no indication of ghostwriting. These data 
sources have a total of 1853 pages. 
Table 1. Selection criteria for cases 
Binds cases on:  
Time: Timeframe 9/11 to January, 2020 
Culture (land/organizational): United States military  
Leadership level: Four-star general officers 
Leadership experience: Commanded troops in combat 
Geography of experience: Commanded troops in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Available data: Memoirs of general officers 
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The selected data sources cover the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. More 
specifically, General Franks, McChrystal, and Petraeus are former U.S. Army officers, 
whereas general Mattis is a former U.S. Marine and Admiral McRaven a U.S. Navy SEAL. 
This representation means that three out of four U.S. military services are covered. Note 
that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had substantial ground components of the U.S. Army 
and the U.S. Marine Corps. The U.S. Air Force was also an important troop contributor in 
those wars, but numerically less than the Army and Marine Corps. A similar rationale 
applies to the U.S. Navy. They contributed troops in, for example, support roles and special 
operations forces. This could explain why the U.S. Army and Marine Corps provided most 
commanders in those wars, resulting in a relatively greater number of memoirs. 
B. BOOK REVIEWS ON THE DATA SOURCES 
All of these memoirs are self-reported data sources with an associated risk of 
confirmation bias. Therefore, we started with an analysis of book reviews on these data 
sources to get a sense of the reviewers’ perceptions. The book reviews are drawn from 
outlets such as Military Review, the Washington Post, New York Times, Foreign Affairs, 
and Political Science Quarterly.  
General Franks describes his military life in the book American Soldier. Hoar 
(2004) reflects that “he [General Franks] gives us an extraordinary view of the contingency 
planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom.” He also describes, “we get some views of the 
secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 
but I would have preferred to see more.” Foutenot (2005) also notes that “Franks is less 
convincing when describing Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s strategic end states.” Hoar (2004) 
has a similar sentiment and says, “my only disappointment with the book centers on the 
narrative related to “Phase Four”-the reconstruction of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.” He also suggests that he would have liked to learn more about 
“Rumsfeld’s management style.” These notes of Hoar (2004) and Foutenot (2005) indicate 
that they suspect some level of knowledge withholding based on General Franks’ account 
on the two politicians. In sum, Foutenot (2005) hopes that “in the coming years he [General 
Franks] will elaborate on the endgame in both campaigns” while Hoar (2004) writes that 
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“the definitive book on these two campaigns, however, will be written at a later time.” Yet, 
Hoar (2004) also calls the book a “great contribution to understanding the campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.” Moreover, Foutenot (2005) also describes the book as “a great story 
… straightforward in ways most autobiographies are not.” He regards it as “honest, 
captivating, illuminating, and direct” and says that “American Soldier is an important 
addition to the genre of military autobiography.” 
General Mattis was a subordinate of General Franks in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Freedman (2020) notes that General Mattis blames, for example, “General Tommy Franks 
for failing to capture Osama bin Laden.” Freedman (2020) also notes that General Mattis 
is “forthright in his criticism” on the policy regarding Iraq and criticized the policy of “first 
for being in too much of a rush to invade Iraq, and the second for being in too much of a 
rush to withdraw.” Sky (2019) finds that General “Mattis is equally forthright in his 
interactions with Iraqi sheikhs.” However, “it’s clear…that Mattis [as Secretary of 
Defense] didn’t see eye to eye with the President [Trump],” Freedman (2020) describes. 
Overall, General Mattis is “admired by his troops for his blunt, no-nonsense talking, and 
respected by civilians for his principled stand against torture and for urging for the U.S. 
State Department to be fully funded” (Sky, 2019). Essentially, Freedman (2020) concludes 
that Call Sign Chaos is about the “practical and ethical challenges of military leader 
behavior” to “send soldiers into the field to kill and be killed.” Sky (2019) agrees with this 
view, says that “the book is in essence about leader behavior,” and concludes that “James 
Mattis shares a lifetime of learning from wars that failed to offer a better tomorrow. We 
need to take these lessons and do better in the future.” 
Years later, Mead (2013) and Bacevich (2013) acknowledge that a defeat of 
American efforts in Iraq was nearby when General McChrystal took command of the 
special operations forces (SOF). Mead (2013) continues that General McChrystal 
reinvented “the military as a more flexible, flatter, faster, and more information-driven 
organization.” Cobb (2013) describes this as “the most intensely transformative period in 
SOF history.” Cobb (2013) also writes that General McChrystal was “an active participant 
in creating the most effective, discriminating and precise killing machine ever devised to 
attack individual targets.” General McChrystal has an “impressive aptitude for military 
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tactics” (Bacevich, 2013) with “successes leading the Task Force in Iraq” (Cobb, 2013) 
while he experienced “enormous pressures, making many errors, and encountering many 
obstacles” (Mead, 2013). 
Mead (2013) refers to the strategy in Afghanistan and says that General McChrystal 
was “arguing persuasively that it represented a reasonable approach.” Cobb (2013) reflects 
that “McChrystal hedged his bets and employed both counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism – but he simply talked up the former and did not discuss the latter.” Bacevich 
(2013) seems to agree with this view and writes that General McChrystal “offers little to 
suggest that success was in the offing regardless of how long he might have stayed in the 
job.” With his resignation after the article in the Rolling Stone, Fontenot notes that “what 
little he says about what happened evokes no sympathy for him and his team” and finds 
too much comparison with Grant and policy “but of this he says little.” 
At that time, President Obama announced that General Petraeus would take over 
the command in Afghanistan. Kaplan writes the book The Insurgents with General Petraeus 
as the main character. Freedman (2013) reviews that “in the wake of the Vietnam War, the 
army had developed an institutional allergy to counterinsurgency.” The reviewer also notes 
that “he [Kaplan] vividly captures the drama of Petraeus’ struggle against a Pentagon 
establishment.” 
Moreover, “one factor stands out throughout this book,” Herspring (2016) 
continues that “it is clear that Petraeus is the conductor of this army symphony. He seized 
on the brilliance and creativity of officers who had taught in the Social Science Department 
at West Point.” However, Cambanis (2013) seems to display some disappointment because 
the “narrative ends before the news of Petraeus’s embarrassing and career-halting 
extramarital affair.” 
So, two generals commanded the same coalition. On the one hand, a review of 
General McChrystal’s book starts with noting that “memoirs or…autobiographies are 
suspect” (Fontenot, 2013). In the case of My Share of the Task, he writes that General 
McChrystal “seems to have no concern for the self-deprecation” but “succeeds in writing-
well.” Hart (2013) notes that “McChrystal does not provide sustained reflection on the 
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nature of leader behavior or its qualities.” He also suggests a “more philosophical account 
of lessons learned” to serve the U.S. military’s transition. He even notes that the book 
“contains many unaddressed undercurrents that require further thought.” Hart (2003) thus 
seems to suspect some knowledge withholding. However, Hart (2013) also noticed that “he 
assumes blame” and “is quick to share credit.” He agrees that “there is much to learned” in 
a book that provides “invaluable insight.” In this line, Mead (2013) calls My Share of the 
Task “one of the best memoirs of life in the U.S. military” and describes McChrystal as 
“self-controlled and professional” to the end. 
On the other hand, reviews have also been written in the book The Insurgents about 
General Petraeus. Jackson (2014) concludes that “at its best, this volume is a revealing, 
second-hand autobiography of the authors of the doctrine. The book is at its weakest in 
connecting these ideas with outcomes.” He argues that it is an “uncritical summary” of new 
doctrine while “it does little to assess its validity.” In this line, Cambanis (2013) speaks 
about “savvy Petraeus” who “knew how to manage up, cultivating powerful Pentagon 
patrons and winning President Bush’s favor with a misleading op-ed in the Washington 
Post.” His rationale is that “they overestimated themselves. They fancied they were 
inventing a new way of war and casting out the demons of a moribund Pentagon. In fact, 
they were doing something far less grandiose.” However, other reviewers have a different 
perspective. Freedman (2013) describes the book as “a disquisition on the meaning of 
contemporary warfare and the challenge of framing a coherent strategy that addresses the 
concerns of civilian populations and intervening governments alike.” While Herspring 
(2016) describes Petraeus as “the intellectual powerhouse behind the change in approach 
to fighting a war,” Freedman (2013) considers the book “to be one of the most important 
works on the U.S. Army extant, there is at least one correction that must be made.”  
During General Petraeus’ command in Afghanistan, Admiral McRaven also served 
in Iraq and Afghanistan as commander of a SOF task force. He described his experiences 
in the book Sea Stories. In his review, Ackerman (2019) recalls this event from the book, 
“when his pistol was later discovered, his father asked him, ‘Do you know anything about 
this?’ McRaven writes: ‘And then, for the first and last time in my life, I lied to my father. 
‘No sir,’ I said.” Ackerman (2019) finds this “Washington-esque in its I-chopped-down-
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the-cherry-tree tone” and continues that “this is the book’s weakness. You can’t help but 
wonder how much these vignettes are aiming for truth and how much are they aiming for 
something else.” Ackerman, as a former Marine officer, regards this as “unnecessary SEAL 
mythmaking.” He concludes with the critiques that “McRaven could have written about 
what isn’t working in the SEAL teams. He could have touched on the emotional costs 
veterans pay for two decades of unending war.” He continues that, “addressing the 
complexity and humanity of the community would have been truly powerful, for being 
unique and new. That level of honesty would have made for the greatest sea story of all.” 
However, Himes (2019) calls the book “the great inspirational book of this genre” and 
notes that “his detailed depiction of the planning and successful execution of the bin Laden 
raid alone is justification for reading this book.” Other reviewers concur with this statement 
and say, “the highlight of the book is McRaven’s detailed account of the successful mission 
to track Osama bin Laden” (“Sea Stories,” 2019, May) and “his account of finding and 
killing bin Laden is one of the best in the literature” (“My Sea Stories,” 2019). 
In sum, these book reviews reveal praise as well as criticism. For example, some 
reviewers argue that a book could have been more reflective, while others reason that a 
particular general officer stands vast under challenging times. One reviewer may call a 
general officer “savvy,” while another describes him as an “intellectual powerhouse.” Due 
to the selection criteria, the time frame in which the general officers commanded troops 
overlap. As a result, the general officers themselves also praise and criticize each other. 
Taken together, while some suspect knowledge withholding, the general officers aimed to 
tell their stories and reflect in various depths on their experiences. The book reviews do 
not reveal a confirmation bias towards knowledge withholding. 
C. DATA COLLECTION  
We analyzed the 1853 pages of the five data sources on meaningful units of 
knowledge withholding. While reading, we paused after every page to reflect on its content. 
We asked ourselves questions such as “does this content reflect the handling of 
knowledge?,” “what actors played a role?” and “who withheld knowledge?” We initially 
coded these as meaningful units on the page where they are described and marked those 
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pages (Saldaña, 2012). These knowledge-withholding units may involve the author or other 
people who withheld knowledge. We also included units where knowledge should have 
been withheld, or instances in which withholding knowledge is suspected. We then 
collected, summarized, and briefly described all the meaningful units in a data collection 
table to analyze the data further. This process resulted in 247 knowledge-withholding units. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
We analyzed the meaningful units in the data collection table with narrative coding 
(Saldana, 2015; Figure 1, Step 1). This means that we searched for clues in the narrative of 
a unit that reveals knowledge withholding. Some units were clear. For example, Admiral 
McRaven broke into an ammunition complex at the military base where he lived with his 
parents. His father came home and asked him, “There has been an attempted break-in at 
the ammunition storage facility. Do you know anything about it?” Admiral McRaven 
answered, “No, Sir.”  
Knowledge withholding in other units was more implicit. For example, General 
Franks describes, “the VC [Viet Cong] ambush was perfectly placed and timed, hitting my 
column from the dense bamboo to out right, exploding a captured American claymore mine 
and raking the trail with AK-47 fire.” The word “ambush” implies that an actor, in this 
case, the Viet Cong, withholds all their knowledge to create a deadly advantage.  
We also included units in which the aim was to withhold knowledge. Examples of 
these units use words such as “secret” or “top secret” documents or words such as 
“sensitive” and “compartmented.” These words imply that knowledge must be withheld 
for unauthorized people. In other cases, words such as “leaked” indicated that knowledge 
was shared with the media. However, the word “leaked” implies that the knowledge should 
have been withheld for the public. 
Furthermore, units also revealed that actors suspected knowledge withholding. For 
example, General McChrystal writes, “I arrived confident and full of ideas. I suspect 
Ranger NCOs [non-commissioned officers] got a bit tired of self-confident commanders 
arriving with notebooks full of new directions for the unit to take.” In this unit, he describes 
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that he suspects knowledge withholding. Hence, narrative coding enabled us to identify 
knowledge withholding within a unit.  
 
Figure 1. The data analysis process 
We continued our data analysis with an attribution coding of the meaningful units 
to identify the participants per instance of knowledge withholding (Saldana, 2015; Figure 
1, Step 2). For example, when a unit describes names of participants such as “General 
Petraeus,” “Mullen,” “the President,” or “President Saleh,” we noted the names in the table. 
In other cases, the authors used the names of job roles such as “my battalion commander,” 
“company commander,” or “chief of staff.” In these cases, we noted the participants by 
their role name. We also encountered participants who were enemies such as “Al-Qaeda,” 
“Viet Cong,” or “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” During the attribution coding, we made a 
distinction between the knowledge withholder and the potential knowledge recipient.  
As a next step, we searched through the units for words that point towards 
knowledge hiding or hoarding. When we found an indication, we applied in-vivo coding 
and noted that in the data collection table (Saldana, 2015; Figure 1, Step 3). We return to 
the example of General McChrystal. He became the commander of a unit and wrote, “I 
arrived confident and full of ideas. I suspect Ranger NCOs got a bit tired of self-confident 
commanders arriving with notebooks full of new directions for the unit to take.” As 
described, we coded this as knowledge withholding, but the unit continues with, “But if 
they did, they hide it well.” Hence, he suspected knowledge hiding. 
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Next, we grouped meaningful units that formed a larger narrative by using narrative 
coding (Saldana, 2015; Figure 1, Step 4). In other words, every unit reflected one instance 
of knowledge withholding, but some units constructed a story of various cases of 
knowledge withholding. For example, after 9/11, General Franks anticipated a U.S. 
military response and asked his staff for potential targets to strike in Afghanistan. He 
withheld the potential targets from his higher command. This larger narrative consists of 
three knowledge-withholding units. However, the number of units could also be higher. 
Admiral McRaven provided a detailed account of the raid on Usama bin Laden in which 
we distilled 21 knowledge-withholding units. 
Furthermore, we grouped actors in an iterative process based on the attribution 
codes and the Step 4 narrative coding (Figure X, Step 5). These groups enabled the 
identification of interdependencies and social identities. We, thereby, started with the 
meaningful units that were not coded as part of a larger narrative. For example, we 
categorized codes such as “Al-Qaeda,” “Viet Cong,” or “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi” and 
labeled them as the enemy. Or, we categorized codes such as “my battalion commander,” 
“company commander,” or “chief of staff” and labeled these as own units. Or, we labeled 
a category as locals with codes such as “President Saleh,” “elders,” “locals,” and “Iraqis.” 
Subsequently, we looked at larger narratives and the actors who played a role. We 
categorized them within an existing category when the actors of all the included units 
matched. For example, if General Franks’s larger narrative consists of three meaningful 
units that all reflect knowledge withholding in his unit, we categorized it as his unit. 
However, some larger narratives included more than one actor category. For example, the 
story of Admiral McRaven and the raid on Usama bin Laden consisted of 21 units with 
various actors. We labeled these larger narratives as a separate category and tagged them 
as leader behavior. During this grouping process, we noticed that, in some cases, 
knowledge is withheld based on an agreed process between actors. We regarded this as an 
important insight, categorized these units separately, and labeled them as process.  
We then reflected on the groups of actors and narratives in relation to the general 
and flag officers in terms of interdependencies. We, thereby, categorized their outcomes in 
negative or positive interdependencies. For example, the ultimate negative interdependent 
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situations are probably those in which two parties fight each other in a war. We, therefore, 
labeled the “enemy” as negative interdependent to the general and flag officers. Also, the 
potentially most intimate, positive interdependent events exist between family members. 
Similar but less intimate are the events between trainees and instructors because in both 
cases, the actors pursue the same outcomes. So, for example, we labeled “family” and 
“instructors” as positive interdependent events. Based on the interdependence theory, we 
also considered that actors who are on the “same side” and fight a war together experience 
a positive interdependence. We, therefore, labeled the actors “competitors” and “locals” as 
such. However, regarding the latter actors, the data revealed a lack of trust in the latter, so 
we distinguished between trusting and non-trusting positive interdependencies. 
However, not all units categorized as either negative or positive interdependent 
situations. In some events, a successful outcome for one actor does not automatically led 
to a successful outcome or failure for the other actor so we labeled those as neutral 
interdependent relationships. The actor “media” or “processes” are examples of such 
relationships. For example, regarding processes, they yielded positive effects for the 
involved actors because they, for instance, provided clarity on when to withhold and when 
to share knowledge. However, they did not reflect a specific type of interdependence. For 
that reason, we have categorized them as reflecting a neutral outcome interdependence 
between the actors.  
Furthermore, we assessed the groups of actors on professional social identities of 
the general and flag officers. For example, the actor “units” reflected instances in which 
the general and flag officers socially identified with their units. We thus categorized all 
groups of actors as either negative, positive, or neutral interdependent or as a social identity 
of the officers. We developed an integrative framework based on these categorizations. 
A second coder also conducts the coding in the data analysis. After Step 1 (Figure 
1), the second coder assessed the meaningful units’ descriptions and quotes in the data 
coding table. The coder labeled them with either “agree” or “uncertain.” In the latter case, 
the first coder extended the quotes from the data sources to represent meaningful units. 
Then, the coders subsequently took Steps 2 to 5 (Figure 1) and discussed the coding 
differences. In the end, this process resulted in 247 meaningful units.  
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IV. RESULTS 
As a first step, we aim to reduce the “messiness” of leader behavior and knowledge 
withholding, hiding, and hoarding. Therefore, we develop a theoretically coherent and 
integrative framework that subsequently describes the negative, positive, and neutral 
interdependent events as well as social identity. However, we then reintroduce the 
“messiness” of human interaction by describing the raid on Usama bin Laden led by 
Admiral McRaven. This larger narrative illustrates how a leader may use the integrative 
framework to deal with multiple actors. 
A. NEGATIVE INTERDEPENDENT EVENTS 
The data reveals 18 units of knowledge withholding that illustrate how both parties 
conduct themselves in this behavior. We start with examples where the general officers 
were confronted with the violent effects of enemy knowledge withholding. For instance, 
General Franks describes how he got ambushed in Vietnam by the Viet Cong. He writes 
that “the VC ambush was perfectly placed and timed, hitting my column from the dense 
bamboo to outright, exploding a captured American claymore mine and raking the trail 
with AK-47 fire” (p. 74). Sometime later, he was on patrol, looking for Viet Cong in a 
village. The villagers “swore on Buddha’s head that they hadn’t seen a thing.” General 
Franks thought that they were in another “dry hole,” but when the patrol arrived at their 
pick-up zone, “the enemy cut loose with everything he had” (p. 81). In another unit, the 
Viet Cong ambushed the patrol led by General Franks from “less than thirty meters away.” 
This situation was much more peculiar than the previous ones because he had no radio with 
him, and “without a radio we had no way to direct them [the helicopter gunships] toward 
the enemy” (p. 108). Hence, the US’s enemy withheld knowledge from U.S. forces to gain 
a tactical advantage on the battlefield.  
The data also shows less violent enemy knowledge withholding. For example, 
General McChrystal describes Task Force 417 hunts on terrorist leader Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi in Iraq. The terrorist leader is very skilled in hiding his whereabouts for the U.S. 
forces. At some point, units of General McChrystal have a promising lead and launch a 
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raid. The general describes that “if Zarqawi was in fact there, he got away” (p. 89). Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi was also very skilled in hiding his communication with other terrorist 
leaders. However, the Peshmerga caught a courier named Ghul, who “was carrying two 
CDs and a thumb drive, which yielded a letter written from Zarqawi to bin Laden and 
Zawahiri” (p. 120). In another unit, General McChrystal’s units detained Mussabir, who 
had a suspected link to a terrorist leader. The interrogator “showed the picture [of the 
terrorist leader] to him, Mussabir waved it away, claiming not to know the man.” In this 
case, the interrogator requested knowledge, but the detainee hid it. General McChrystal 
continues, “for weeks, Mubassir refused to recognize the face in the picture.” After a 
“marathon nighttime session” with the interrogator, the detainee is wearied down and 
acknowledged his knowledge of the terrorist leader with “I love that man very much” and 
“that is my brother” (p. 211). Thus, the enemy aimed to withhold and hid knowledge of 
their locations and communications for U.S. forces. 
Conversely, the U.S. forces also withheld and hid knowledge from their enemies. 
For example, General Franks describes how he develops a plan with the Coalition Forces 
to assault Iraq. He notes that “surprise and speed were the key elements of the plan” (p. 
153). General Franks also describes that the Iraqi watchtowers at the border with Saudi 
Arabia are the first targets when the Coalition Forces start their massive assault. He was 
there when the towers were attacked by artillery and describes, “Exploding like a 
firecracker, the tower disappeared in a cloud of smoke and pulverized concrete” (p. 155). 
The Coalition Forces were not attacked or counterattacked by the Iraqis. Thereby, the 
knowledge withholding of the Coalition Forces from the Iraqi forces seemed to be 
successful. However, the Coalition Forces did share knowledge with the Iraqi forces. The 
Iraqi intelligence service Mukhabarat “had recruited April [an American military officer] 
as a double agent.” However, “Unknown to the Mukhabarat, the officer had contacted his 
chain of command within hours of the Iraqi’s initial overture.” As a result, the Coalition 
Forces were “feeding disinformation to the regime of Saddam Hussein” and thereby hiding 
their real intentions. General Franks notes that “because of the sensitivity of the deception, 
only a few of us in the U.S. government were aware of it.” Thus, U.S. forces withheld 
knowledge to gain a tactical advantage on the battlefield.  
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The data also shows that the U.S. forces were not always successful in withholding 
their knowledge for the enemy. General McChrystal describes how U.S. forces intended to 
free the U.S. embassy staff who were taken hostages in Iran in 1980. During Operation 
Eagle Claw, “The demands of operational security were understandably heavy. But the 
mission was too corseted.” The term “operational security” implies that the knowledge is 
hidden from the enemy so that the assault force has the tactical advantage of surprise. 
Moreover, the assault force aimed to maintain their surprise by avoiding “detection at the 
airstrip.” General McChrystal also writes that “the soldiers would spend the night hiding 
in advance of an early-morning assault” (p. 35). Despite the focus on knowledge hiding, 
the assault force endured multiple accidents and lost eight servicemen. Operation Eagle 
Claw was aborted and became an upright catastrophe for the U.S. military. A potential 
reason for this failure is that the term “operational security” implies that knowledge about 
an upcoming operation is withheld for all non-involved personnel. However, the clause 
“But the mission was too corseted” suggests that knowledge was too tightly withheld 
within the assaulting forces. As a result, the assault force’s various elements had not 
rehearsed the maneuvers together, which could be one of the reasons for the accidents. So, 
knowledge hiding to the enemy had its advantages, but a similar level of withholding within 
an assault force can have devastating effects.  
B. POSITIVE INTERDEPENDENT EVENTS: TRUST BETWEEN ACTORS 
The data reveals 18 knowledge-withholding units within families. These units show 
that knowledge is withheld between parents and children or between husband and wife. 
We start with examples of parents who withheld knowledge for their child. For instance, 
General Franks describes that his father missed a finger, but Franks never asked his parents 
how that had happened. He writes, “For some reason, I never asked him about this. And he 
never chose to discuss the injuries.” When General Franks lived in Midland, Texas, his 
uncle Bob explained that “your dad got hurt when was about ten years old” (p. 10). In line 
with this, General Franks’s parents withheld knowledge about his adoption until he was a 
junior at high school. He notes that “my folks finally told me I had been adopted” when “I 
was a junior at Lee High School in Midland, Texas” (p. 12). Again, some years later, 
General Franks was living in a student room in Austin, but his parents couldn’t afford it 
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anymore. They sold their business to move to Austin so that Franks could live with them 
and reduce their spending. His father started the conversation with “I’m selling the 
business, Tommy Ray. It’s not working out the way I hoped, and I’ve got an offer.” Later 
in the conversation, his mother continued with, “we are planning to move down to Austin” 
and “we’ll get a place and we can all live together.” General Franks notes, “Only later that 
afternoon did I realize what my parents had in mind: If I moved back in with them in 
Austin, it would save them the ninety dollars a month room” (p. 31). These instances 
illustrate that parents thus withheld knowledge for their children.  
The data also shows that the general officers, as children, withheld knowledge from 
their parents. For example, as a kid, Admiral McRaven lives on a military base with his 
parents. He and his friend Jon plan to sneak onto a high-security ammunition compound at 
the base. Admiral McRaven’s mother asked the boys where they are heading to that 
afternoon. They answer that they go to the “clubhouse.” At the end of that day, Admiral 
McRaven writes, “Mom gave me a big hug and asked where I have been all day. ‘At the 
clubhouse,’ I answered. That’s nice, she said” (p. 24). He hid his adventure at the 
ammunition storage for his mother. However, when his father came home, Admiral 
McRaven needed to go to the living room and was asked, “there has been an attempted 
break-in at the ammunition storage facility. Do you know anything about it?” Admiral 
McRaven answered with “No Sir” (p. 25). He thereby also hid his activity for his father. 
So, children also withheld knowledge for their parents 
Furthermore, the data illuminate instances that show that the general officers also 
withheld knowledge for their wives. For example, General McChrystal “scheduled a 
parachute jump” for his unit, which was “finished after midnight.” After the jump, he 
“decided to raise morale” and organize a party at his house, but “the plan…was not relayed 
to Annie [his wife]” (p. 30). By withholding his party plans for his wife, she was surprised 
when the unit ringed the door with cases of beer. It could also be worse. Admiral McRaven 
had a parachute accident. He was severely wounded and ended up in the hospital. He asked 
a buddy to “call Georgeann [his wife] and let her know I am all right” while he was far 
from all right (p. 147). It could also be better. General Franks describes that he wanted to 
marry Cathy. After an exercise, he bought a ring and looked for her at the university 
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campus. He describes, “Cathy was on her way to class. But I convinced her to go for a ride 
instead. By the time I dropped her back at the sorority house to change for dinner, she was 
wearing that diamond” (p. 60). Hence, the general and flag officers withheld knowledge 
for their wives. 
Besides family, the data also uncovered 12 knowledge-withholding units in positive 
interdependent situations between instructors and trainees. For example, Admiral 
McRaven applies for SEAL training and notes that “it was difficult to find out anything 
about SEALs or SEAL training” (p. 36). While in training, they were briefed by a trainee 
who had been through Hell week. This week is known as the hardest week of the training. 
This trainee was a “rollback” and had to do Hell week again. While this trainee had all the 
knowledge and experience of a previous Hell week, the only advice he offered was, “you 
must stick together” (p. 38). At some point during that Hell week, the students knew it 
might be the last day of Hell Week, but the SEAL instructors tightly withheld that 
knowledge. Only after the relieving words “congratulation, Class 95. Hell Week is over” 
and “get the Class out of the water,” they knew for sure that the week was over. General 
Franks provides another example. During his crypto analyst training, the students had to 
break an encrypted code. The instructor hoarded his knowledge on the correct code so that 
the students could learn from the exercise. When General Franks thought he broke the code, 
he notes, “I carefully printed our answer and handed the worksheet to Sergeant Reilly.” 
The instructor then acknowledged the successful code-breaking of General Franks and 
said, “Outstanding, Franks! Way to go, Feldman. You men found the correct eight-letter 
word based on just the first five letters.” Hence, instructors withheld and hoarded 
knowledge for trainees to support their learning and development.  
However, the data reveal instances in which trainees may also withheld knowledge 
for instructors. For example, General Franks describes that he got blisters and limps while 
marching, but he doesn’t say it to the platoon sergeant. The platoon sergeant comes to him 
and says, “Been watching you, boy. The way you march ain’t normal. Come with me.” 
General Franks walked with the platoon sergeant to the barracks. He says he knows that 
General Franks has got blisters and asked, “why didn’t you tell me?” He then explained, 
“I’m your platoon sergeant. My job is to get all your sorry asses trained as soldier, and that 
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won’t happen if you can’t march” (p. 37). Thus, in some cases, trainees also withheld 
knowledge for their instructors. 
Besides family and instructors, knowledge is also withheld between the general 
officers and politicians. For example, General Mattis describes a conversation that he had 
with “Vice President Biden and his assistants” about the prime minister of Iraq Maliki. He 
writes that they “listened politely. But as we spoke, I sensed I was making no headway in 
convincing the administration officials not to support Maliki.” Vice president Biden 
apparently intended to maintain support for the prime minister, but did not share that. 
General Mattis notes, “But he was past the point where he was willing to entertain a ‘good 
idea.’” Another instance also illustrated the knowledge withholding of General Mattis to 
the Secretary of Defense. They had a meeting in which they had to decide how and where 
to cut Defense budgets. General Mattis describes, “I listened attentively, not wanting to 
add my gripes to the litany already heard. I got up to get a Coke in the back of the room, 
where I stood listening. I thought for a few seconds and decided, what the hell. I took a 
napkin and scribbled on it: Disband JFCOM-Mattis.” He, thereby, proposes to disband his 
organization to meet the budget demands. This may seem a spontaneous action, but it was 
“based on many months of reflection and experience of decades spent looking at what 
delivers real capability.” This suggests that he already knew that his organization created 
overhead but withheld that until budgets were restrained. Hence, politicians and general 
officers withheld knowledge for each other.  
C. POSITIVE INTERDEPENDENT EVENTS: A LACK OF TRUST 
BETWEEN ACTORS 
The data reveals 12 events in which people withheld knowledge to each other. 
These people represent various organizations that are positively interdependent in a sense 
that they all have to cooperate to achieve the US’s goals. However, they withheld 
knowledge due to a lack of trust. For example, General McChrystal notes that there was 
“counterproductive infighting among the CIA, State Department, Department of Defense, 
and others back in Washington” (p. 116). He later continues with “special operations and 
CIA worked together only marginally better than they had during Operation Eagle Claw in 
1980. At best, we were fighting parallel, fractured campaigns against Al-Qaeda; ours had 
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to be a united fight” (p. 118). As described earlier, during operation Eagle Claw, knowledge 
was too tightly withheld between and within fighting elements. In another instance, 
General Mattis describes how the FBI and attorney general held a press conference about 
a bomb plot. The plot was directed from the Iranian Qods force. While Iran was in the area 
of responsibility of General Mattis, he notes, “I was puzzled why CENTCOM hadn’t been 
informed beforehand” (p. 230). Hence, the data illustrates that organizations that fight the 
same enemy in a war did not trust each other and withheld knowledge. 
Furthermore, knowledge is not only withheld between organizations but also within 
a single organization. Again, actors withheld their knowledge while the situation seems to 
be positive interdependent. For example, General Franks was under investigation during 
his Vietnam tour, but he did not know that. Four days after a fierce fight with the Viet 
Cong, a helicopter landed at General Franks’ camp. Two people stepped out and asked for 
the artillery liaison officer. He describes, “None of the senior officers shook my hand; nor 
did they smile, or exchange the usual pleasantries. One of the colonels was from the 
Inspector general’s office; the other was a JAG lawyer. He presented a printed form and 
directed me to swear that my statement was voluntary, true, and complete.” They then 
asked General Franks to drive to the place where the fighting took place. He writes, “Half 
an hour later, as we drove from blasted house to shattered factory, I’d begun to figure it 
out” (p. 104). Eventually, he became aware that they suspected him of applying excessive 
violence during the fight. So, while both parties are at the “same side” and aimed to fight 
the Viet Cong according to the law, the data indicates that investigators did not trust the 
suspect and withheld knowledge.  
Next, a lack of trust and subsequent knowledge withholding also occurs between 
individual actors within an organization. For example, General Petraeus’s book illuminates 
instances in which an actor shares knowledge with somebody else but, at the same time, 
hoards their knowledge for other people. The author describes, “What none of these people 
knew - not Gates, Edelman, Casey, Abizaid, nor, for the matters, Kagan - was that Keane 
had also shared the slides with Ray Odierno.” In this example, Keane shared a slide with 
Ray Odierno but did not inform Gates, Edelman, Casey, and Kagan (p. 239). The author 
describes another unit in which Odierno and Petraeus shared knowledge, but their 
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communication needed to be kept secret. He writes, “The two couldn’t communicate 
directly during this time,” because Odierno and Petraeus would be “accused of subverting 
the chain of command” (p. 249). Thus, these instances indicate that individuals did share 
knowledge with a trusted partner but withheld from other, potentially less trusted people.  
A lack of trust in positive interdependent situations led to knowledge withholding 
between organizations and individuals within a country. Simultaneously, the data suggest 
the existence of this mechanism also between a military force and local populations. For 
example, in General Petraeus’s book, the author describes how the same problems seemed 
to reoccur regularly. He writes, “At first he [Maliki] blamed the problems on 
miscommunication and incompetence, another instance of weak governance,” but after the 
Americans concluded that “they [the Shiite politicians] were responsible for making them 
happen.” He continues that “wiretaps revealed that Muqtada Sadr’s lieutenants [insurgents] 
had been tipped off just before an American raid got under way.” This indicates that Iraqi 
Prime Minister Maliki withheld his knowledge about and connections with Shiites for the 
Americans. The author concludes that “Maliki’s power base rested in part on Sadr, so, 
regardless of what the American wanted, Maliki’s administration would protect him” (p. 
188). In this unit, the American military and Prime Minister Maliki seemingly fight the 
insurgents together and are therefore positively interdependent. However, this unit also 
illustrates that both parties do not trust each other. Moreover, the wiretaps reveal that Prime 
Minister Maliki seems to experience a more substantial positive interdependence with 
Shiite insurgents. In another example, General McChrystal describes an American 
Tomahawk missile strike on Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Pakistanis might “think the 
U.S. missiles crossing over their country were from India,” so the U.S. warned Pakistan. 
However, the Americans “gave the Pakistani notice, but just barely,” because “Pakistan’s 
military and intelligence establishment would tip off the Taliban or bin Laden” (p. 69). 
Thus, the Americans withheld their knowledge until their enemy could not be warned 
anymore because the Americans do not trust the Pakistani military and intelligence 
organizations. Hence, the data illustrates that positive interdependent actors withheld 
knowledge when they do not trust each other. 
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D. NEUTRAL INTERDEPENDENT EVENTS 
The data reveals 10 neutral knowledge-withholding instances. We provide an 
example of General McChrystal, who interacted on various occasions with a Rolling Stones 
magazine reporter. He aimed to give the reporter and the pubic transparency about the 
difficulties that the command team encountered while fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
However, the reporter published an article named “The Runaway General,” which led to a 
storm of controversy and General McChrystal’s resignation. When he read the article, he 
describes, “For a number of minutes I felt as though I’d likely awaken from what seemed 
like a surreal dream, but the situation was real.” The reporter did not focus on the 
difficulties of fighting the Taliban, but rather on the command team’s supposedly critical 
attitude towards their political leader behavior. General McChrystal continues that “its 
ultimate effect was immediately clear to me” and that he “knew only one decision was right 
for the moment and for the mission.” He flew to the U.S. to speak to his higher command 
and President Obama. He writes that he had a “professional meeting with President Obama 
and drove to Fort McNair to tell Annie that the president had accepted my resignation” (p. 
388). This instance indicates that General McChrystal decided to resign directly after 
reading the article but waited to offer his resignation until he met with the President.  
We continue this story with a unit from the book of General Petraeus. That author 
describes that “he [Obama] called the general [McChrystal] to the White House for a one-
on-one meeting on June 23.” The author continues that “McChrystal had tendered his 
resignation the day before.” This indicates that General McChrystal offered his resignation 
to President Obama on June 22, which was also the Rolling Stones article’s publication 
date. This suggests that General McChrystal withheld his knowledge about his planned 
resignation for a shorter time than described in his book. While this may be the case, both 
units show that General McChrystal withheld his knowledge about his planned and actual 
resignation for the public. Actually, President Obama held a press conference later that 
day. Kaplan (2013) writes, “That afternoon, he [President Obama] announced the move 
[resignation of General McChrystal] at a press conference.” The author continues that “the 
president introduced the general he’d chosen as McChrystal’s replacement - David 
Petraeus” (p. 338). 
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The data also illuminates 29 units as a category in which knowledge is withheld 
from certain (groups of) recipients due to procedures or processes. For example, 
publication processes of academic articles, doctrine, or field manuals tend to result in a 
withholding of knowledge to readers for some time. Moreover, Professor Kalev Sepp 
“arrived in Iraq in early November 2004” (Kaplan, 2013, p. 103). Kaplan writes that “as a 
first step, he [Professor Kalev Sepp] wrote out a list of all the insurgency wars in the 
twentieth century” and “then, jotting down the factors that led to victory or defeat in each 
conflict.” The commander Casey, approved the article, and it was sent to the journal the 
Military Review. Kaplan (2013) continues that “Darley [the editor of the Military Review] 
knew he had a classic on his hands. He emailed Sepp ... that it needed footnotes.” 
Eventually, Kaplan notes that “the footnoted essay appeared in the May-June 2005 issue” 
(Kaplan, 2013, p. 107). This unit indicates that Professor Kalev Sepp wrote his article at 
the end of 2004 and that the publication process took several months to make it available 
for the readers of the Military Review. Hence, the publication processes did result in 
knowledge withholding between actors.  
Planned meetings are another form of procedural knowledge withholding. This 
means that meeting participants withhold their knowledge until the planned meeting 
occurs. General Franks describes several of these units in the planning phase of the assault 
on Iraq. The U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld gave General Franks the order to look at 
the existing plan and brief him next week. Rumsfeld said to General Franks, “Please dust 
it off and get back to me next week” (p. 315). At the planned meeting, General Franks 
briefs Rumsfeld about the planning. Rumsfeld then said, “Well, General, you have a lot of 
work ahead of you,” and “Today is Tuesday. Let’s get together again next Wednesday, 
December 12. I want to hear more details at that time” (p. 335). At the next meeting, 
General Franks briefs Rumsfeld again, who then notes, “This is a good beginning, but I 
need more detail before I take it to the President.” Rumsfeld continues with, “Let’s talk 
next week” and “I want this to be worked by a very small group. There are still too many 
leakers, and this must not be leaked” (p. 344). Now, besides that Rumsfeld expects that 
General Franks withholds his knowledge to him until the next planned meeting, he also 
explicitly notes that the knowledge must be withheld for the media and public. Then, 
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Rumsfeld called General Franks and said that “the President does want you to do the 
briefing out in Crawford tomorrow.” Again, Rumsfeld expects General Franks to withhold 
his knowledge until the planned meeting with President Bush. Hence, scheduled meetings 
did also result in knowledge withholding between actors.  
E. SOCIAL IDENTITY: COMMANDERS AND THEIR UNITS 
The data illustrates 59 knowledge-withholding units between the commanders and 
their units. For example, General Mattis reflects on the fact that commanders must love 
their soldiers and must be able to send them to death. He thereby quotes the novel The 
Killer Angel, “To be a good officer you must be willing to order the death of the thing you 
love [his men].” He then reflects, “the mission comes first. Personal solace must wait for 
another day.” This indicates that General Mattis distinguishes between himself as an 
individual and himself as a commander, whereby the latter represents his whole unit. 
During the battle, he, therefore, ordered to withhold knowledge, “To maintain my 
emotional equilibrium, I knew I couldn’t be informed about casualties, let alone their 
names, while fighting. I instructed my staff not to report the names or the number of 
casualties to me unless their mission was jeopardized” (p. 31). General Franks says 
something similar. When his commander arrived at the spot of a brutal attack, General 
Franks notes, “I studied Eric Antila’s [the commander of General Franks] eyes. I knew he 
was gripped by anguish, but he never let it show.” General Franks then explains, “In war, 
it is necessary that commanders be able to delay their emotions until they can afford them” 
(p. 99). The data also illustrates that general officers may identify themselves with broader 
Services such as the U.S. Army. For example, Kaplan (2013) describes that “the Army’s 
top generals said ‘Never again’ to the notion of fighting guerrilla’s in the jungle (or any 
place else)” (p. 2). This suggests that the “top generals” socially identified with the U.S. 
Army as an organization and wanted to avoid another “debacle of Vietnam.” As a result, 
“they [top generals] threw out the book (literally: they threw out the official manuals and 
curricula) on anything related to what was once called ‘irregular wars.’” Hence, these units 
illustrate that commanders socially identify with their units and organization. Moreover, 
especially during combat operations, knowledge withholding enabled commanders to 
focus on achieving the mission.  
30 
Furthermore, General McChrystal “stressed transparency and inclusion” within his 
task force and wrote, “I shared everything with the team.” However, he too withheld 
knowledge and notes, “Rare exceptions to this policy of transparency were sensitive 
personnel issues and cases when sharing would betray someone’s trust” (p. 151). General 
McChrystal describes in another unit how commanders build trust by requesting 
knowledge withholding. In this instance, General McChrystal commander asked him to 
prepare a briefing for a four-star general. When General McChrystal wanted to go through 
the presentation, his commander asked, “Stan [General McChrystal], is it good?” The 
commander then said, “If you think it’s good, I don’t need a brief; I trust you.” According 
to General McChrystal, the effect was that “his willingness to trust was more powerful than 
anything else he could have said or done” (p. 54). General Mattis was also focused on 
maintaining “the trust in our tight-knit platoon.” During a jungle training, a corporal 
discussed his concerns with General Mattis. A Marine had said he would “like to kill the 
fucking hard-ass lieutenant.” General Mattis walked to that Marine and describes, “I told 
him to follow me back through the jungle to the company command post. At the end of the 
hike, I told him that he could have shot me in the back. But he didn’t have the guts” (p. 8). 
Hence, commanders withheld their knowledge or asked to withhold knowledge to build or 
maintain trust.  
A recurring theme in the data was the application of commander intent. This means 
that a commander only shares what he expects that subordinates achieve but not how they 
are realized. General Mattis explains, “The details you don’t give in your orders are as 
important as the one you do” (p. 44). In other words, he withholds knowledge to “unleash” 
“their [subordinate commanders] cunning and initiative.” In another unit, he describes, 
“After I communicated my intent, subordinate commanders, along with their Navy and 
Marine staffs, drafted plans for how they would execute their parts of the mission” (p. 60). 
While this practice is widely described in doctrine, the data shows that the reality is less 
straightforward. Kaplan (2013) describes “David Kilcullen [expert in counterinsurgency 
doctrine] came to Iraq in late February 2006.” Kaplan continues that “he [David Kilcullen] 
spent several hours talking with some of these newly arrived junior officers: the American 
lieutenants, captains, and majors.” These officers had read the new strategy and 
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“understood its drifts,” but said, “I get what we’re supposed to achieve, but what are we 
supposed to do?” Hence, commanders applied knowledge withholding as they provide their 
commander’s guidance, but the extent to which knowledge should be withheld seems to 
differ per situation. 
F. THE INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK AS A TOOL FOR LEADERS 
The data reveals 54 units that construct nine narratives. These units represent 
multiple actors and interdependencies. We use one narrative of Admiral McRaven to 
illustrate the reality of leader behavior and its numerous interdependencies. This narrative 
tells the story of the raid on Usama bin Laden. The narrative starts with the Joint Chief of 
Staffs, Admiral Mullen, who speaks to Admiral McRaven about a potential intelligence 
lead to Usama bin Laden. He says, “you can’t tell anyone else about this mission.,” which 
means that Admiral McRaven needs to withhold and hide his knowledge for others. 
Admiral McRaven subsequently has a meeting about the intelligence lead at a CIA facility 
but calls the facility “The Pentagon” to withhold his destination for his (personal) staff. He 
makes it even more explicit to his personal assistant and says, “I can’t tell you anything 
right now and I need you not to ask any question.” He explicitly tells his assistant that he 
withholds knowledge and, upon asking, would hide it. While he drove to the CIA facility, 
he was a bit anxious because his “command had dozens of folks working at the CIA, and 
sooner or later I knew one of them would spot him slinking into the facility.” He shares 
that he “hoped to have a better cover story” by then. Using a cover story, he shares 
knowledge, but he withholds his true intentions. Thus far, these meaningful units illustrate 
a commander who socially identifies with his unit and withheld his knowledge. 
After the meeting at the CIA facility, Admiral McRaven starts developing plans for 
an operation to capture or kill Usama bin Laden. He needs extra expertise in his planning 
team and asks Admiral Mullen permission. Admiral Mullen answers with, “Don’t speak 
with him [the requested expert] until I get back to you.” Sometime later, the Secretary of 
Defense contacts Admiral McRaven and says, “The President is likely to want a Concept 
of Operations in a few weeks.” Admiral McRaven answers that he can only be certain of 
success when he brings in “aviation and ground operators to really look at the problem and 
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rehearse the concept.” Admiral Mullen, who is also present, answers, “For now it remains 
just you… But no one else is allowed in until the President agrees.” The President allows 
Admiral McRaven to add people to his planning team, and Admiral then calls a Navy SEAL 
officer. Before he briefs the officer, the Admiral ensures knowledge hiding with a “yes, 
Sir” on his question. “I am going to tell you something, and I need to ensure that no one, 
absolutely no one else, learns about this.” Besides knowledge withholding of a commander, 
these units describe a process approach of withholding in which the President must give 
permission to share and asks for a briefing at some point.  
Next, Admiral McRaven and the officer go to a meeting with the CIA. The Admiral 
instructs the officer with “just listen. The last thing I want is for the Agency to think that 
we are trying to take over the mission.” The officer is thus expected to withhold his 
knowledge about what the Navy SEALs regard as viable options. During the planning 
phase, Admiral McRaven is still the commanding officer of a task force of special 
operations forces (SOF) in Afghanistan, so he often flies between Afghanistan and the 
United States. Usually, these flights would attract attention, but the situation in Libya was 
deteriorating, so “for the next several months, all my [Admiral McRaven] movements and 
my frequent visits to the White House were assumed to be closely held planning for Libya.” 
He thus kept the assumption alive to withhold knowledge on the potential operation on 
Usama bin Laden. He also uses this “shallow cover story” when he calls the aviation 
squadron commander and says, “I needed one of his best pilots for a few days just to do 
some preliminary planning for a possible Libyan contingency.” Now, besides a 
commander, these units revealed sensitivities between positive interdependent 
organizations and subsequent knowledge withholding.  
At some point, the representatives of the CIA and SOF meet to discuss the 
operational options. During the meeting, there are tensions between the two organizations. 
CIA gathered the information, and they want to conduct the mission while Admiral 
McRaven provides support for a raid by the Navy SEALs. The Director of the CIA was 
also present and quietly listened. Admiral McRaven describes, “As the meeting ended 
Panetta pulled me aside and reaffirmed his support for the SOF raid.” Again, sensitivities 
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and even competition appeared between the two organizations, and it seems that Panetta 
wanted to withheld his opinion for his organization.  
When Admiral McRaven had to brief the President, the director of the briefing 
room in the White House, “Subtly made it known that he was unaware of whatever was 
transpiring that afternoon. There was no record of the meeting on the President’s calendar, 
and the Situation Room schedule only indicated the room was blocked.” During the 
briefing, the President decided that Admiral McRaven could inform the assault force and 
rehearse it. He describes, “The Navy SEAL officer and his squadron had just returned from 
Afghanistan and were on leave for three weeks. Three weeks! It was the perfect cover for 
action. No one at his command would ask about his whereabouts. No one would miss him 
at work.” The squadron commander hand-picked the assault force and instructed them to 
be at a meeting. He “hadn’t provided the new guys [the assault force] with any information 
on why they were here nor whom they were meeting with.” So, “none of them knew why 
they were being asked to come to North Carolina on such short notice.” And, the CIA 
officer began the meeting by “handing out non-disclosure forms.” These instances illustrate 
knowledge withholding by various levels of commanders within their units as well as to a 
White House employee. The latter represents a neutral interdependent situation with 
Admiral McRaven. 
After the CIA officers’ briefing, the raiding force’s rehearsals began straightaway 
at a U.S. Airforce facility. Admiral McRaven describes, “While the Airforce officers 
weren’t read-in to the mission, they knew that owing to the priority we had been given, 
something very important was in the works. They were incredible professional and equally 
discrete.” This indicates that the Airforce did not ask why the assault force rehearsed, 
thereby enabling the knowledge to be withholding. They also practice what they should do 
when locals gather around the house of Usama bin Laden. Admiral McRaven writes that 
“if a crowd develops Mohammad will tell them it is a Pakistani exercise and to go back to 
their homes.” This means that the assault force plans to hide their operation by acting as 
the Pakistani military. These instances illustrate positive interdependent situations in which 
actors did not trust each other and, therefore, withheld or hid knowledge.  
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Subsequently, the assault force moves to Afghanistan and needs a quick reaction 
force in case they require assistance. However, they use a quick reaction force that is 
already in Afghanistan because “those forces wouldn’t need to be notified until the day of 
the mission, so OPSEC [operational security] could be maintained.” On the day of the 
mission, the Admiral informed the regimental commander, and “he devised a cover story 
to assemble the QRF without anyone taking notice.” The commanders in Afghanistan, 
General Petraeus, and CENTCOM commander, General Mattis, would be informed on the 
upcoming mission by their chain of command. However, when Admiral McRaven speaks 
to General Petraeus, he finds out that “Petraeus had been left out of the planning for the 
raid.” Also, when “I [Admiral McRaven] called Mattis,” he “found out he knew little about 
the mission as well.” These units illustrate commanders who withheld or hid knowledge 
for their units or other units or knowledge that is being withheld for commanders. 
The assault force of Navy SEALs eventually conducted the daring raid and killed 
Usama bin Laden. The President would make an announcement late that evening in the 
United States. McRaven describes that “it was unprecedented that a President would come 
on television so late in the evening.” Some presenters speculated that “it must be that 
Mohammar Gadhafi was dead…What else could it be?” The President withheld his 
knowledge on the outcome of the raid for the public until a planned media conference. 
Long story short, the operation was a success. 
35 
V. DISCUSSION 
This paper explained knowledge-withholding events and mapped the respective 
actors in a framework of interdependence theory and social identity theory. We categorized 
eight actors, whom we labeled as the enemy, family, instructors, media, locals, politicians, 
people of other (parts of the) organization(s), and immediate team members. The data 
revealed that knowledge is withheld by the general and flag officers and these other eight 
actors. Furthermore, we found that leaders withhold knowledge in both negative and 
positive interdependent situations as well as in situations in which they experience a level 
of social identity. Moreover, we found that trust plays a pivotal role in positive 
interdependent situations. In other words, even in situations where people’s outcomes have 
a positive relationship, actors will withhold their knowledge from actors whom they do not 
trust. Next, we found that people withhold knowledge when it is part of a predetermined 
process. Last, the data illuminated larger narratives that showed that leaders apply 
knowledge withholding as a tool to achieve their goals.  
However, we also identified several limitations of our research. We briefly 
discussed these and connected them to potential avenues for future research. First, we 
categorized eight actors, but we expect that there may be many more categories. We believe 
such additional categorizations are important because they likely will increase the 
understanding of the framework’s mechanisms. As said, when future research considers 
the enemy actor on a continuum of competitional intensity, it may become apparent that 
people inside one country, one organization, or even one department regards others as an 
enemy. This raised awareness combined with the theoretical mechanics of the social 
identity theory may enable leaders to reduce knowledge withholding, hiding, or hoarding 
within their organization or team. Therefore, we propose that future research continue to 
categorize actors. We suggest that a way to do will be to investigate social contexts outside 
the military such as commercial corporations, non-governmental organizations, or political 
institutions. 
Second, while we introduced and coded for knowledge hiding, we found only 
limited evidence. As described, knowledge hiding is defined as the intentional hiding of 
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requested knowledge (Connelly et al., 2012). We believe that this concept may be 
prominent in negative interdependent situations. Moreover, as said, the general and flag 
officers withheld knowledge from the enemy and vice versa. Obviously, enemies in a war 
will not request knowledge from each other, but in situations of less competitional intensity 
there might such interactions. We also expect knowledge hiding in positive interdependent 
situations in which actors do not trust each other. The data showed examples of the general 
and flag officers withholding knowledge from locals or people from other (parts of the) 
organization(s). Despite the potential obviousness, we believe it is important to investigate 
knowledge hiding in these situations. An increased level of awareness could result in a 
better application of knowledge hiding as a tool for leaders. Also, research showed that 
knowledge hiding and distrust might strengthen each other in a vicious cycle (Cerne et al., 
2014). Consequently, when leaders intend to build trust with another actor and are aware 
of the effects of (perceived) knowledge hiding, they may consciously stay away from this 
behavior. Therefore, we propose that future research focus on knowledge withholding in 
both negative and positive interdependent situations. Future research may also investigate 
the relationship between knowledge hiding and trust and, specifically, whether knowledge 
hiding triggers the pivotal function of trust in positive interdependent situations.  
Third, the coding for knowledge hoarding also resulted in limited evidence. As said, 
knowledge hoarding is also regarded as intentional behavior but focuses on unrequested 
knowledge (Connelly et al., 2012). We expect that this concept has a broad application for 
leaders. They may hoard knowledge to benefit themselves in the sense that the advantage 
occurs at the individual level. This will most likely be in negative interdependent situations 
or in situations of positive interdependence that lack trust. However, looking at the social 
identity theory, they may also hoard knowledge to gain an advantage for their team or 
organization. Depending on the leader’s hierarchical level, the benefits could manifest 
themselves for large groups of people. Future research may raise leaders’ awareness of the 
potential usage of knowledge hoarding as a tool. Therefore, we propose that future research 
investigates the antecedents and effects of knowledge hoarding in negative and positive 
interdependency situations. Future research should also investigate how knowledge 
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hoarding contributes to group outcomes and how both the ingroup and outgroup members 
perceive it. 
Fourth, while we found limited evidence for knowledge hiding and hoarding in 
these memoirs, this does not mean that leaders do not apply these concepts. Nevertheless, 
this might indicate that these memoirs, despite their reflective nature, insufficiently 
describe the details about intentions and requests within the knowledge-withholding 
situations. Based on our research, we do believe that these concepts play a role in leader 
behavior. More importantly, we expect these concepts to serve as additional tools for 
leaders to achieve their goals. Therefore, we propose that future research investigate the 
antecedents and effects of knowledge hiding and hoarding. Future research should also 
focus on the three concepts’ covariance to identify whether such a distinction is valuable 
for theoretical and practical purposes. A similar approach should be taken for the 
identification of their antecedents and effects.  
Fifth, as described, the framework draws on interdependence theory and social 
identity theory. While these theories explain the knowledge-withholding situations derived 
from the data sources, we are aware of the memoirs’ reflective nature. In other words, the 
general and flag officers may have reflected for many years on these situations before they 
wrote their respective books. We suspect that leaders who are in knowledge-withholding 
situations might experience a less clear picture. For example, an actor might experience 
multiple social identities simultaneously. Future research should investigate whether one 
identity trumps another identity and in what cases. Also, in such cases, future research 
could investigate how identity perception changes the interdependence structure of a 
situation. Or, how identity perceptions may change the trust and its pivotal role in positive 
interdependent situations.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we investigated leader behavior in knowledge-withholding events. 
We, thereby, focused on the research questions: “In what types of events do leaders 
withhold knowledge?,” “Who are the other actors in knowledge-withholding events?,” and 
“How do leaders use knowledge withholding in their work?” The theoretical framework 
that we applied to answer these questions consisted of interdependence theory and social 
identity theory. By using a qualitative methodology, we collected data from five memoirs 
of U.S. general and flag officers. We, therefore, analyzed 1853 pages that resulted in 247 
meaningful units of knowledge withholding. 
In sum, besides the general and flag officers, we categorized eight actors of 
knowledge withholding: the enemy, family, instructors, media, locals, politicians, people 
of other (parts of the) organization(s), and immediate team members. We, thereby, found 
that both the general and flag officers and these eight actors withheld knowledge. More 
specifically, people withhold knowledge in negative interdependent situations to gain a 
benefit for themselves. When people trust each other in positive, interdependent situations, 
they withhold knowledge to achieve both parties’ desirable outcomes. However, when they 
lack trust, they prioritize their outcome over the other’s outcome. Next, people also 
withhold knowledge because it is part of a predetermined process. Furthermore, the data 
illustrated that people who socially identity with a group may withhold knowledge in favor 
of that group’s outcomes. Taken together, the data revealed that leaders apply knowledge 
withholding as tool to achieve their goals.  
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